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cline many of them as they occur, the number of these blemishes will be minimized. Proper names are too significant to be trifled with. One needs only to recall his embarrassment at some time in his life when he has been speaking either to some one, or about some one with whose name he was partly or wholly unfamiliar. Vergil did not in every instance use the name that he preferred, for considerations of prosody and other insurmountable obstacles sometimes confronted him, but generally his choice was free, and it should therefore be respected. When he says *Ilium* we should say 'Ilium', and when he says *Teuceria* we should not say 'Troy'. His desire to avoid monotony led him to use various names of the same person, place, or people, but not infrequently there is in a name that has been employed a special significance, which is wholly lost if the exact equivalent is not used. For instance, if Teucer insists on his descent from the Trojans, he may not convince King Belus, but if he says, "Even my name, Teucer, proves my descent from the ancient stock of the Teucrians", he will convince Belus and, what is better, the modern student. One of the most critical moments in the story of Aeneas is overlooked if the 'voice' on the island of Delos is addressed to the 'hardy Trojans'. When the name Dardanidae was heard they should have thought of Dardanus and of Italy whence he came, but no, they listened to the reminiscences of a childish old man, and because Crete was so near, they were wafted to the ancient shores of the Curetes, there to suffer from drouth and plague. I have occasionally used this episode as a text for a sermonette on the wisdom of paying attention and the folly of following the line of least resistance. It was the sly disposal of the weapons on the Strophades that gained for the band of Aeneas the epithet *Laomedontiadae*, sons of Laomedon the false, whereat, no doubt, stories of broken promises and of the vengeance of the gods and of a demigod recurred to their minds, as they will recur to the mind of the student, if he has been properly instructed. Proper names in Vergil and their significance would of themselves furnish material for a long paper, but I forbear.

Other points that suggest themselves in a discussion of the teaching of Vergil in the secondary school are here omitted either because of their minor importance or because of lack of time. In regard to all these, however, it is proper to say that a teacher of the Aeneid is to be applauded if after he has taught his class many things, there yet remain many other things that he has faithfully kept hidden.

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#### REVIEW

The Greatness and Decline of Rome. By Guglielmo Ferrero; translated by Alfred E. Zimmern. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons (1907).

Vols. I and II. Pp. VI + 328; VI + 389. \$5.25 net.

Signor Ferrero is peculiarly fitted by his work in other fields to write a complete history of the Roman Empire. After beginning his career as the collaborator of Lombroso in *La Donna Delinquente*, he turned to the study of modern politics and economics, and, in his *L'Europa Giovane; Studi e Viaggi nei Paesi del Nord* (1897), discussed the industrial condition of the Latin races of Europe, and compared them unfavorably with England and Germany. The results of this training are apparent in the *Grandezza e Decadenza di Roma*, the first two volumes of which Mr. Zimmern has translated into English; for the author has not taken the standpoint of a mere chronicler of wars, or of a specialist on constitutional government, but has presented the development of Roman imperialism, as it was affected by the social and economic conditions of the ancient world.

Signor Ferrero begins his history with the death of Sulla, when the victories of the great Dictator in Greece and Asia had caused the wealth of the East to flow into Roman coffers, and thus inaugurated a new era of prosperity. "The new Italian bourgeoisie, composed of landlords and merchants, great and small, men of culture and ambitious politicians, had grown strong by means of speculation, trade, and education . . . and was ready to govern the Empire in the place of the old and enfeebled aristocracy"; this was the class which forced the vacillating Senate to decree the annexation of Bithynia, and to enter upon the new policy of imperialism. This new policy was inaugurated by Lucullus, who substituted a series of vigorous campaigns for the course of intrigue which the Senate had ever used in its dealings with the peoples of the Orient. He thus reduced one state after another, and in a few years was the arbiter of Asia. He failed, however, to realize that the character of his troops had changed with the times, and aspired to be the military martinet of the days of the elder Scipio. It was therefore easy for Clodius to arouse discontent in the soldiers of the army in Asia by comparing their hard lot with the advantages enjoyed by the veterans of Pompey.

Clodius, according to Signor Ferrero, was only the tool of Pompey, who had determined to secure for himself the position of Lucullus, and who, through his agents, the tribunes, used the financial situation to bring about the recall of his rival. It was with the idea of eventually obtaining the command of the army in Asia that he caused himself to be elected to conduct the war against the pirates, and his desire to secure a showy and speedy victory and the consequently superficial character of his conquests were due to this ambition. This view of Pompey's campaign seems to explain the fact that

after his triumph had been duly celebrated he still found it necessary to fit out ships to protect the coast against further incursions made by the sea-robbers. The "well calculated moderation", attributed to him by Mommsen, was merely the best means of securing with the greatest possible despatch the prestige of a victorious general.

While Pompey, as the representative of the new imperialism, was reaping where Lucullus had sown, Crassus became a democrat. This change of front Sig. Ferrero supposes to have been due to a determination on the part of the great financier to adopt the tactics of his successful rival, and to come forward as the promoter of a new enterprise—the annexation of Egypt. This was his motive for allying himself with the democratic party, and for purchasing the aid of one of its most able, as well as most needy, members, Gaius Julius Caesar. This theory, based on a passage of Plutarch (Crass. 13), explains the conversion of Crassus to democracy and his friendship with Caesar. It affords a clue to the mysterious reference of Cicero to those who had designs on Alexandria in 65 B. C. (De Leg. Agr. 2. 44), and renders more intelligible the statement of Suetonius (Iul. 11) that Caesar (who in this year was only an aedile) was trying to obtain Egypt as a province.

Of the conspiracy of Catiline the author has given a vivid account. He has rightly shown that it was only after Catiline had been defeated twice in his candidacy for the consulship that he organized the real conspiracy. Previously, his platform had been the abolition of all debts—a measure too radical to enlist the sympathy of Caesar, and particularly of Crassus, who had too many debtors to be willing to support any such unbusiness-like proposal. It was therefore doomed to failure despite the votes of the Etruscan peasants, whom Catiline had brought to Rome to swell the numbers of his supporters, and whom popular imagination transformed into veterans of Sulla. The effect of the suppression of the conspiracy on the Consul of 63 is also well portrayed. Cicero, who had hitherto been unaffected by love of money or of power, and whose only ambition was to win fame as an orator, began to consider himself an able statesman and the savior of his country. He began to live in the style which he considered to be in keeping with such an exalted position, and thereby caused his enemies to say that the capitalists had paid him for his execution of the accomplices of Catiline (see the Italian edition, I. 414).

The formation of the first Triumvirate Sig. Ferrero supposes to have been brought about *after* the election of Caesar to the consulship. In this he accepts the testimony of Suetonius (Iul. 19), as opposed to that of Plutarch, Appian, and Dio, all of whom place the combination of Crassus and Caesar with Pompey *before* the elections of 60, and whose

authority has usually been followed. This theory seems to be strengthened by a passage in Cicero (Ad Att. 2. 1. 9), according to which Caesar was to arrive in Rome in June, 60. There would then hardly have been time before the election to carry out the intrigues necessary for such a combination. On the other hand, the theory that a moderate democracy, modeled after that of the year 70, was planned by Caesar, is not tenable. This, according to the author, was transformed into a pure democracy after the passage of the Land Bill of 59. This bill, however, though perhaps less radical than many of Caesar's later measures, was quite in keeping with the general plan of the Triumvirs, and neither this law nor Caesar's previous record proves that the idea of a moderate democracy was ever contemplated. The policy of "the Three-headed Monster" was consistently carried out from the beginning by means of the organization, which Sig. Ferrero calls the Tammany Hall of Rome.

By means of his well organized political supporters Caesar secured the proconsulship of Gaul, left vacant by the sudden death of Metellus Celer. Entirely ignorant of the real conditions obtaining in Gaul, he was eager to win a military reputation, and hastened to declare war on the Helvetians, who were popularly supposed to be contemplating an invasion of Gaul. This much dreaded invasion Sig. Ferrero shows to have been only a great *trek* from the mountains to a more fertile region. Caesar, not daring to attack the large band of Helvetians, followed them at a distance, until they suddenly offered battle. This engagement resulted in the discomfiture of the Romans, for the author thus interprets the confused account of the Commentaries (I. 25-26), which he shows to have been intended to conceal a Helvetian victory. So Roman imperialism in Gaul, says Ferrero, began with a blunder and a defeat. The consequences of this blunder are more fully developed in an appendix (which, it would seem, the translator has taken from the French edition, as it does not appear in the original Italian). The attempt is made to show that the Helvetians were invited to *trek* into Gaul by the nationalist party, headed by Dumnorix the Aeduan. This party had planned to drive out the German invader Ariovistus by means of a Pan-Gallic alliance, while the Romanizing faction, under the leadership of Divitiacus, was relying on the aid promised by the Roman Senate. Caesar then attacked the tribe which might prove a welcome ally in the inevitable struggle with the Germans, and thus alienated the nationalists, who had invited the Helvetians to come into Gaul. This theory is interesting, but it rests on too little evidence. Its only foundation is the friendship of Dumnorix for Orgetorix and his unwillingness to fight against the Helvetians. On the other hand, the destination of the Helvetians, Saintonge,

shows that they had no intention of fighting against Ariovistus, who was in the land of the Sequani.

The difficulty of Caesar's position at the end of his governorship is rightly emphasized by Sig. Ferrero. Deserted by Pompey, who had accepted from the conservatives the office of sole consul for 52, Caesar found that a reaction had set in against him and his policy of imperialism. The Italian public could not understand why the war in Gaul lasted so long. Largesses and banquets failed to restore his prestige, and even his Commentaries, calculated to show the Romans that the Proconsul of Gaul was a capable and merciful general, failed to arouse confidence in him. At the outbreak of the Civil War Caesar was generally discredited and despised.

The author then shows that Caesar was most reluctant to fight with Pompey and the conservatives, and that the war was due to the machinations of a few politicians. These men, blinded by their hatred for Caesar, caused the Senate to reject all advances from him, and forced Pompey to assume command of the troops in Italy. Yet it may be doubted whether Caesar was really so unwilling to engage in war. A man of his keen penetration must have realized the futility of his overtures of peace, and must have recognized that war was inevitable. Sig. Ferrero's estimate of the two leaders is a healthy reaction against that of Mommsen. He deals sympathetically with the shortcomings of Pompey, and is fully aware of the weaknesses of Caesar. He rightly shows that after the Civil War the Director was no longer equal to the task of accomplishing what he had begun. Worn out by a multiplicity of cares, and often nervous and irritable, he now offended the Romans by a tactless act, now sought to win them by some wise reform or some grandiose project such as the scheme for the conquest of Parthia. But none of these measures could save him, for Caesar was not a great statesman, but only the greatest demagogue of history (Italian version, 2. 514).

Sig. Ferrero's work is characterized by keen insight and vivid historical imagination. He has seen through masses of misleading details, and has used his knowledge of the political and social conditions of to-day to illuminate the fragmentary record of Rome, and has produced a work which is invaluable to all who are interested in the history of Antiquity.

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### SUMMER MEETING AT CAMBRIDGE

The Summer Meeting of the University Extension movement, held at Cambridge during last July and August, afforded such a unique opportunity for classical students that it seemed a pity it had not been more widely advertised among American colleges. Very few Americans, apparently, were present, which would certainly not have been the case

if the advantages offered had been more widely known. It seems therefore worth while to state thus far in advance that next year's summer meeting will be held at Oxford in August, and that the subject will be Mediaeval and Modern Italy—less interesting, no doubt, to most readers of *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* than this year's subject, Ancient Greece. Other courses of lectures were, of course, included, in science, economics, hygiene, education, and other subjects, but these were offshoots from the general scheme, in which four or five lectures each day dealt with Greek literature, history, geography, art, archaeology, or philosophy. Nor were these lectures merely popular; to guarantee their quality it is only necessary to mention the names of the lecturers—Professor Jackson, Professor Ridgeway, Dr. Verrall, Miss Jane Harrison, Dr. Arthur Evans, Professor R. C. Bosanquet, Professor Waldstein, Mr. Cornford, and many others of like eminence, but too many to enumerate.

Professor Jackson gave a course of four lectures entitled *Some Aspects of Greek Thought*; the first lecture was devoted to the early philosophers, the second to Socrates, the third to Plato, and the fourth to Aristotle, in which he marvellously contrived to give—*experto crede*—the substance of the course of lectures he delivers in preparation for the paper on Greek philosophy now included in the first part of the *Classical Tripos*. Even apart from the value of the lectures, it was a great pleasure to come in closer contact with Professor Jackson's delightful personality, and to write down some of his *obiter dicta*, e. g., "Plato's views of women were based on abstract principles of justice; all he knew of contemporary women must have been entirely opposed to this; therefore his abstract sense of justice must have been strong".

Professor Ridgeway gave six lectures on *The Making of Greece*, beginning with the material remains of the stone and bronze ages, and ending with the Dorians and the beginnings of classical Greece.

Dr. Verrall's subject was *The Oracle of Delphi in relation to Greek Tragedy*. His first and third lectures, dealing with Aeschylus and Euripides, while including some new material, dealt largely with questions already familiar to those who know his books, but the second, on Sophocles, was mainly new, for, curiously enough, Dr. Verrall has published almost nothing on Sophocles except the chapter he contributed to the *Life of Sir Richard Jebb*, in which he confined himself mainly to the Philoctetes and the Trachinians. In the lecture Dr. Verrall devoted a large space to the *Electra*, and the extraordinary skill with which in that play Sophocles disengages the story as a story and makes it the center of emotional interest, waving away the moral question of matricide. He also dealt with the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, and read the wonderful chorus in which the search for the